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Following Superstorm Sandy, the City and the State of New York initiated two separate, 
federally funded, recovery programs for residents along the East Shore of Staten Island. New 
York State offered a retreat style buyout program for three small neighborhoods which would 
require the purchased land to remain open space in perpetuity. The City’s program, conversely, 
rehabilitates, reconstructs, or acquires properties with the goal of building back more resilient 
housing. This thesis aims to understand why both approaches were being offered to residents 
along the East Shore and what impact this might have on the community’s resilience to future 
flood events. 
Through an examination of the history of the East Shore, as well as the post-Sandy 
planning processes and recovery programs I uncovered a complex set of interactions between 
various levels of government and between residents and government. Through archival research 
and interviews I attempt to unpack this complex web of interactions. Additionally, through a site 
visit I examine what this complicated recovery process has meant for the character of the three 
neighborhoods targeted for buyout and the choices the city now faces about the area’s future.  
In the conclusion section I set out potential recommendations for the future resiliency of 
New York City, as well as best practices for future post-disaster recovery efforts in New York 
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In October 2012 Hurricane Sandy – also called “Superstorm Sandy” – devastated the 
Northeast and officially registered as the second costliest Hurricane in US history (first is 
Katrina) causing $75 billion in damages with 233 fatalities (EM-DAT Database). Extensive 
disasters such as Sandy require intense collaboration among various levels of government to 
create and coordinate recovery programs and administer aid to those in need. 
The primary aim of this research is to understand what lessons can be learned from 
previous attempts at flood recovery, specifically the myriad of planning activities and recovery 
programs rolled out for residents of the East Shore of Staten Island after hurricane Sandy. The 
research also takes a particular look at the State’s buyout program for three specific communities 
of the East Shore to understand why this was pursued as a strategy as well as how, and if, 
buyouts and retreat should be pursued in future recovery efforts. Additional lessons are learned 
from an examination of post-disaster recovery in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina.  
In the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy, two parallel, federally funded programs began 
purchasing homes from those who volunteered along the East Shore of Staten. One, offered by 
Governor Andrew Cuomo and the State of New York—the New York Rising Buyout Program—
began acquiring properties within three specific communities, with the requirement that the 
newly public land be forever preserved as open space. The other, offered by the City of New 
York under first the Bloomberg and then the de Blasio administration—the Acquisition for 
Redevelopment pathway of the Build it Back program—acquired properties with the mandate to 
redevelop the acquired parcels as new, resilient structures. My research began with the 
fundamental question of why these two separate processes, working toward divergent ends, had 
been established for residents of the East Shore. The presence of both retreat and redevelop 
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strategies within overlapping and adjacent areas of communities along the East Shore provides a 
unique case study to better understand the complex social and political decisions that led to this 
phenomenon, as well as the challenges such a community may face moving forward. 
 
Figure 1: Image of New York City’s Five Boroughs. Wikimedia Commons. 
 
Figure 2: Map Showing Parts of Staten Island and Brooklyn with Sandy Inundation and Location of East Shore Buyouts. Map by 
Emily Schmidt. In Rush, 2015. 
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Figure 3: Map Showing the Locations of the East Shore Buyout Areas Along with the Framework from the Resilient 
Neighborhoods Plan. New York City, 2017. 
The recovery paths available for residents may have had more to do with neighborhood’s 
abilities to politically mobilize than based on sound land use policy. While the City, State, and 
outside groups all launched a number of formal planning processes, each of these unfolded 
largely independently of one another, and the acquisition programs themselves were only loosely 
affiliated with them. This created a situation which left many residents frustrated and confused 
about what their options were and how to even pursue them. In addition to the confusion for 
residents, it seems that some of these processes may have actually developed in response to, or 
even competition with, alternative programs.  
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The East Shore presents an interesting case study, several communities self-organized 
and lobbied for buyouts to be offered. My research uncovered a history of numerous floods and 
wildfires in the area’s past that seem to be key as to why these communities were willing to 
pursue retreat as a recovery strategy. Additionally, a history of long promised but undelivered 
protection systems may have lowered residents trust that the City would protect them moving 
forward. The presence of this community led retreat strategy and the subsequent high rate of 
buyout participation of at least one buyout area, Oakwood Beach, along with lower rates of 
participation in Graham Beach and Ocean Breeze (who were offered the option nearly a year 
after Oakwood Beach) make the East Shore a compelling example to study.  
I begin with a history of the East Shore, highlighting the repetitious cycle of floods and 
fires along with residents’ frustration with being the ‘forgotten borough’. In chapter three I speak 
about Superstorm Sandy and the initial response which took place. In chapter four I chronical the 
bottom-up organizing that resulted in the State stepping in to offer a buyout recovery program to 
three neighborhoods along the East Shore. In the fifth chapter I dive deeper into the City’s 
parallel recovery program, Build it Back, and speak about its preference to rebuild structures in 
place, or acquire for redevelopment when necessary, with Mayor Bloomberg proclaiming his 
distaste for retreat as a strategy. The sixth chapter is an analysis of post-disaster planning 
processes, highlighting first the numerous planning processes that took place in New York, with 
a specific emphasis on those with relevance to the East Shore, and second, post-disaster planning 
and recovery in New Orleans in terms of its relevance for buyout and acquisition strategies. 
Finally, I conclude with recommendations for moving forward which might aid the East Shore, 
New York City, or other future recovery processes, especially as it relates to buyouts and 
acquisitions and the use of retreat as a post-disaster strategy 
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Methodology 
 In support of this thesis I utilized several sources of information. The first was nine 
formal interviews I conducted with a variety of individuals including: academics, city planners, 
agency administrators involved in managing recovery programs, a participant in the Build it 
Back program, and a sociologist who conducted extensive research along the East Shore. My 
formal interviews were supplemented with additional informal conversations that occurred as the 
result of various events I attended such as panel discussion as well as guest lecturers at academic 
events or in coursework. 
 Second, I relied on extensive archival research. This included familiarizing myself with 
the academic literature as well as case studies on climate adaptation, disaster recovery, and 
acquisitions, buyouts and retreat. I utilized government documents including the Action Plans 
governing the recovery programs and monitored the public statements of the Governor and 
Mayor through an analysis of news articles. I was also able to comb through historical news 
articles which helped me understand the history of the East Shore in terms of its relevance to 
contemporary issues. Additionally, I examined numerous planning documents to understand the 
various planning studies and activities taking place in order to better understand the post-disaster 
planning process.  
I supplemented all of this with a site visit to assess the current conditions of the buyout 
areas as of Spring 2018 along with some demographic and land use analysis attained from the 
Census and New York City PLUTO (Primary Land Use Tax Output) data. The following thesis 
is a synthesis of my findings from all of these sources, along with potential recommendations for 




The History of the East Shore 
Summer Getaway 
 To understand the dynamics of the East Shore, both in terms of its hazard vulnerability 
and its unique social characteristics, you need to understand its history. The area now occupied 
by the East Shore, in fact, was not even always land at all. The East Shore was created as the 
result of the recession of the Laurentide Ice Sheet around 16,000 BCE. As a result of the 
recession of the glacier, new flat land was formed in what is today the East Shore of Staten 
Island. This type of land formation is known as a glacial outwash plain. Along much of its edge, 
land can be found at even lower elevations as developers filled in wetlands (Collins, 2005) 
(Urban Waterfront Adaptive Strategies, 2013). 
 Initial settlement of the East shore was by the Dutch, whose first community was Oude 
Dourp (Old Town) in what is present day South Beach in 1661 (Steinmeyer, 1987). In the late 
19th century, the East Shore gained popularity as a summer getaway destination. This beach 
tourism was further encouraged by new rail infrastructure, connecting to South Beach in 1886. 
(Leng and Davis, 1930). In 1890, a reporter for the New York Times remarked that “South Beach, 
on Staten Island, has grown wonderfully in popularity in the last few years. It is about forty 
minutes ride… by the Staten Island Ferry boats and rapid transit trains” (“Phases of City Life,” 
1890).  
 Soon, the area became a regional attraction sparking development to continue farther 
South along the East Shore. In 1901, the Midland Railroad Terminal Company received a grant 
from the State Land Board for “about seventy-six acres of land under water at Midland Beach…. 
The company is to erect piers, wharves, and buildings” (“Staten Island Land Grant,” 1901). By 
the following year, The New York Times was reporting that more than 7,000 people had visited 
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Midland Beach and 6,000 visited South Beach in a single day (“New York’s Sunday Outing,” 
1902). 
 This development led to the construction of bungalows all along the East Shore. By 1930 
there was as many as 10,000 people who rented bungalows between Midland Beach, Graham 
Beach, and Woodland Beach alone and the bungalows in South Beach also numbered in the 
thousands (“Scores of Homes Burned,” 1930) (“40 Police Called Out,” 1930). Many of these 
homes were built in areas vulnerable to flooding. According to Alan Benimoff of the College of 
Staten Island, the number of homes built in “SLOSH zones,” (Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges 
from Hurricanes; a methodology used to determine an areas vulnerability to storm surge) 
increased from less than a hundred to more than a thousand during the 1920s alone (Beminoff et 
al, 2015, 26). 
 Around the 1950s many of these seasonal bungalows became year-round residences. At 
the time of Sandy many of these homes were still in use, having been grandfathered in as 
compliant despite their inadequate building standards (Special Initiative for Rebuilding and 
Resiliency, 2013). Once again, the population grew as the result of transportation infrastructure 
with another wave of development and inhabitants following the construction of the Verrazano 
Narrows Bridge in 1964. Some thought that the construction of the Verrazano Narrows Bridge 
might triple the population by 1980 (Bennet, 1959). 
 While not quite reaching the heights projected, indeed the islands population had nearly 
doubled by 1980 (Tumarkin and Bowles, 2011) (“Staten Island Growth Management,” 2014). 
The increased connectivity of the island combined with the lack of available land in the other 
four boroughs led Richmond County (Staten Island) to continue to grow at a rapid clip well into 
the 21st century. In fact, the period from 1990-2010 saw nearly 25% growth, making it the fastest 
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growing county in the state (Tumarkin and Bowles, 2011). Much of this additional construction 
was again occurring in flood prone areas (Beminoff et al, 2015). Between 1980 and 1990, 
according to Benimoff, as many as 1,800 new homes were built in the island’s “SLOSH-zones.” 
Much of this occurred along the East Shore, and the area saw a further decrease in its marshes as 
more and more land was reclaimed. 
 As construction continued at a high rate many of the older style bungalows were replaced 
by larger more modern structures. However, the remaining bungalows were often isolated, 
surrounded by larger homes. Additionally, the average price of a three-bedroom home doubled in 
a five-year period in the late 90s (Fioravante, 2002). These changes led Mayor Bloomberg to 
launch a taskforce to study neighborhood change and character in the area in the early 2000s. 
The resulting recommendations were formally adopted as the Lower Density Growth 
Management Area (LDGMA), a zoning overlay for the Staten Island that reduced density 
(“Staten Island Growth Management,” 2014).  
 As the transportation and connectivity of the island continued to increase - whether 
through ferry, train, or bridge - the population and the development of the East Shore grew as 
well, often times in flood-prone areas, or the site of former marshes. Despite the obvious benefits 
of higher quality home construction in reducing resident’s vulnerability to natural hazards, this 
development did little to upgrade other forms of collective protection, reduced the wetlands in 
the area, and placed thousands more residents in high risk zones. 
 Communal protections were upgraded, but not sufficiently. A 2002 Times article stated 
that “The Army Corps of Engineers replaced a berm that was eroding and planted trees and 
bushes, and it repaired floodgates near the sewage treatment plant” (Fioravante, 2002). Despite 
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these minor upgrades, they did not stop flooding from occurring during a 2010 storm, let alone 
Superstorm Sandy (Platt, 2010).  
Fire and Water 
 Flooding in Staten Island is well documented. As far back as 1932 there are New York 
Times articles documenting extensive flooding. One article chronicled that “thousands of 
Summer bungalows at South, Midland, New Dourp, Oakwood and Great Kills were flooded and 
badly damage” (“Tide Floods Big Area,” 1932). Another report the following year documents 
flooding at Midland Beach (“Gale and Floods Hit Coast,” 1935). 
 During the 1950s, as bungalows began to be used as year-round permanent residences the 
vulnerability increased. In 1950, it was documented that more than 300 families were living in 
small dwellings at Ocean Breeze during a flood that occurred in November (“1500 Families on 
Staten Island,” 1950). Additional flood events in 1953 and 1955 resulted in 700 evacuations 
each. (“Beach Area Aided on Staten Island,” 1955) (“Tide Floods Homes,” 1953). A devastating 
Nor’easter hit Oakwood Beach in 1992, which damaged coastal defenses, and left the area more 
vulnerable to additional floods in 1994 and 1996 (Knafo and Shapiro, 2012).  
 The East Shore also experiences wildfires. This is largely the result of a non-native 
invasive species, the Phragmites australis, which provides ample fuel to wild fires (Foderaro, 
2012). The East Shore has endured thousands of blazes of various sizes, with 103 major 
outbreaks reported between 1996 and 2010, prompting a mandated Federal Community Wildfire 
Protection Plan (Community Wildfire Protection Plan, n.d.).  
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Figure 4: East Shore Wildfire Incidence. Community Wildfire Protection Plan 
 At the same time, flooding became exacerbated occurring frequently as the result of even 
small and moderate storm events. As early as the 1930s many were complaining of flooding due 
to moderate rainfall and tidal events ("Staten Island Group Asks Flood Control,” 1937). This is 
believed to have grown much more severe following the development post-Verrazano Bridge 
construction ("Staten Island Group Asks Flood Control,” 1937). The effect was two-fold: 
increased development meant that more people resided in flood prone areas, and new 
development increased the flooding of existing structures in the form of runoff from increased 
impervious surfaces and roadways. 
 The City itself may be to blame for some of the areas flooding problems, selling off large 
portions of “swampy land” in the early 1960s to developers (New York City Planning 
Commission, 1966, 30). A 1966 City Planning report showed that, “flood plain and drainage 
problems are particularly apparent in the Graham Beach, Midland Beach, and Oakwood Beach 
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areas. These difficulties are exacerbated when homes which are built below the finally approved 
grades are threatened by run-off from legally conforming streets” (New York City Planning 
Commission, 1966, 62). 
 This same report recommends a local body to address development issues, however, it 
does not appear one was ever created. Despite the serious issues outlined in the Planning 
Commission’s report, they ultimately assigned the issue a low priority. “The Staten Island 
development problem is not the single most important issue confronting the City of New York at 
this time…. It cannot be assigned unlimited fiscal and manpower resources, nor should it” (New 
York City Planning Commission, 1966, 2). 
 The State’s major post-Sandy report, the New York Rising Community Reconstruction 
(NYRCR) Plan for the East and South Shores, states that “rapid development and lack of 
planning during a period of extreme growth led to overdevelopment across Staten Island,” 
concluding that “while new homes were constructed infrastructure did not—and in most cases 
has not—kept up with pace of new development” (Perkins Eastman, 2014, 21-24). This 
mismanagement has resulted in homes built below street grade, and inadequate drainage and 
storm sewer systems, as well as reductions in natural wetland systems (Perkins Eastman, 2014).    
There is some indication that the City may be at blame for some of the flooding issues 
due to loose regulations and the granting of variances as well as a lack of enforcement for 
existing rules (Peters et al, 2014). According to former Department of Environmental Protection 
Commissioner Albert Appleton the City, “routinely sold land to developers without 
environmental restrictions, anxious for the revenue from such sales and also believing that 
promoting residential development on Staten Island was a way to keep middle class families in 
the City” (Appleton, n.d.). These sales sometimes blocked the path of proposed flood protection 
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measures such as a proposed Army Corps of Engineers levee (Knafo and Shapiro, 2012). These 
failures are key as the lack of adequate coastal protections was identified as a cause of the 
vulnerability to Sandy (Perkins Eastman, 2014). 
Failure to Protect 
 As far back as 1937 residents of the East Shore have petitioned for increased coastal 
protections. In that year an organized petition to authorities for the Army Corps of Engineers to 
provide protections for Midland Beach was launched. The response, as was often the case, was 
the promise of a report (“Staten Island Group Asks for Flood Control”, 1937). An historical 
analysis uncovered a repetitious pattern of residents lobbying for more protections, authorities 
producing reports, but very little actually being constructed. Additionally, what did get built was 
often temporary or otherwise inadequate. 
The Army Corps released a comprehensive report all the way back in 1964 calling for a 
15-foot levee to protect Oakwood and Midland Beach as well as additional protections for the 
entire length of the East and South shores. These recommendations did not materialize 
prompting yet another report in 1976 again calling for the additional levee protection 
(Schuerman, 2013). Again, no action was taken leading to another study in 2000, which still 
wasn’t complete by the time Sandy struck in 2012. Finally, with an infusion of Federal post-
disaster funds, NYC Planning completed the study as part of its Resilient Neighborhoods 
planning program. The East Shore Resilient Neighborhoods report was completed in April 2017. 
Additionally, the funds to finally implement many of the report’s recommendations, including 
the Army Corps levee, is in place with the City, State, and Federal government all chipping in 
(Shapiro, 2015). Along the way, spurred in part by a continued lack of investment for 
protections, following a nor’easter in 1992 residents of Oakwood beach organized a flood 
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advocacy group, the Flood Victims Committee. Their efforts were met with additional temporary 
protection measures, but not the permanent or adequate protections necessary (Staten Island 
Advance Editorial Board, 2012). 
Bluebelt 
 Another report in Staten Island aimed, in part, at flood mitigation stands out for its use of 
nature, not manmade protections, to reduce flooding on the island, the Staten Island Bluebelt. As 
Albert Appleton, the DEP Commissioner who inaugurated the program, explains: “nature has 
been managing floodwater successfully for a long time” (Appleton, n.d.). The program identifies 
parcels that could be tied into its network of open space, then obtains those parcels and directs 
storm water to them.  
 
Figure 5: Staten Island Bluebelt Watersheds. New York City Department of Environmental Protection, n.d. 
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The Bluebelt, contrary to the manmade protections, actually moved fairly rapidly toward 
implementation. The program had been implemented in three different stream corridors in just 
three years and the originally conceived system is now completely built out (Appleton, n.d.). One 
reason the Bluebelt was implemented so much quicker than the other forms of coastal protection 
was its considerably lower cost. The program didn’t need to use Federal funds and land could be 
obtained incrementally, over time as funds became available. The project also benefitted from 
strong public support, whereas the Army Corps plans were often controversial (Peters et al, 
2014). The Bluebelt system is also tied into the plans for the levee as well as the acquisition and 
buyout programs along the East Shore. Perhaps most interesting, however, is that the bluebelt 
provided a pre-existing example of a buyout program on Staten Island for the express purpose of 
mitigating flood impacts and restoring the areas wetlands. 
Future From the Past 
 Many contend that the East Shore’s past is instrumental in understanding its path forward 
post-Sandy. The area’s prior experience with both small and large scale environmental problems 
and the history of repetitive loss was in large part responsible for its residents’ advocacy for 
buyout. 
 Additionally, the East Shore’s development as a summer getaway led to a development 
typology that is vulnerable to storms, not just the older wooden structures, but also small lot, 
narrow roads, and poor infrastructure. There is considerable debate, however, about how the area 
should be reconstructed post-Sandy, with the State’s plans to convert buyout property to open 
space with the potential to tie in with the existing Bluebelt, as well as other plans to redevelop 
the area, whether by government or private market intervention. Various actors are operating 
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with a variety of goals including how to balance resilience with affordability and concerns over 
the future of neighborhood character. 
 It is important to understand the motivations people may have for living in such a 
vulnerable area. Some may feel compelled to feel unsympathetic to those who knowingly reside 
in areas that flood. Yet, many residents of the East Shore have lived there for generations, often 
settling out of an understandable desire to live near the beach. Additionally, they are victims of a 
government that has repeatedly promised to address the flood issues with little to no action over 
the years. Staten Island is sometimes called the “forgotten borough,” and residents have 
repeatedly been promised that protections were on their way. This history has left residents 
feeling ignored and largely distrusting of plans and promises made by the City. This lack of trust 















On October 29, 2012, Superstorm Sandy struck New York City. The storm took an 
unusual perpendicular trajectory which aligned with both the daily and monthly high tide to 
produce a large storm surge (Beminoff et al, 2015). As a result, the vulnerable neighborhoods 
fronting the Atlantic Ocean saw the most extensive inundation and damage from the storm. Due 
to the geographical location of the East Shore, along with other factors such as housing type, 
development patterns, topography, and lack of coastal protections, the area suffered more than 
other regions of the City. Storm surge levels were reportedly up to five feet higher along the East 
Shore than the 14 feet recorded at the Battery in lower Manhattan (Perkins Eastman, 2014). 
The result of Staten Island’s vulnerability combined with large storm surge meant that the 
island saw extensive property damage and loss of life. The Special Initiative for Rebuilding and 
Resiliency (SIRR) report cited bungalows as being four times more likely to sustain severe 
damage than other housing types (City of New York and Bloomberg, 2013. Along the East 
Shore, some bungalows were ripped completely from their foundation and carried off to adjacent 
marshland (Hunter College East Shore Studio, 2013) (Knafo and Shapiro, 2012). About 16% of 
the islands population resided in inundated areas, more than any other borough (City of New 
York, 2013). Furthermore, the island saw twenty-three fatalities, with seventeen (40% of the 
total for the whole City) of those occurring in Oakwood Beach, New Dorp Beach, Midland 
Beach, and South beach (Scheurman, 2013). Elderly and young children were especially 
vulnerable with reports of some drowning in their own homes, and others being rescued from 




Figure 6: Map of Staten Island communities included in the State-led buyout program with the extent of Sandy’s storm surge. 
Map by Emily Schmidt. In Rush, 2015 
Initial Response 
 
 In the immediate days after the storm the needs in many areas, including the East Shore, 
were greater than what the government and nonprofits could swiftly address. As a result, 
community and faith groups as well as neighbors intervened to provide immediate aid. To the 
residents of Staten Island this lack of City support appeared to be a continuation of the island’s 
status as the “forgotten borough” (Connelly and Barr, 2012). Whether the response in Staten 
Island was more delayed than other areas of the City is somewhat irrelevant as the mere 
perception that this is the case would continue to shape residents’ attitudes toward government 
recovery policy moving forward. Some I have spoken with have indicated that the area may have 
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already had a pre-disposition against government intervention both in terms of the failure of 
government to build out flood protections, but also that some local residents were predisposed to 
a libertarian world view (Pawlowski, in discussion with the author, 2018) (Koslov, in discussion 
with the author, 2018). 
 On the day before Sandy, President Obama signed an emergency declaration authorizing 
funding to the region for immediate life-saving activities and followed-up by declaring a “major 
disaster,” on October 30th which opened up additional funding for individuals through FEMA. 
The City also mobilized emergency and coordinating activities for the initial damage assessment 
and cleanup.  
It immediately became clear that due to the extensive residential damage and 
displacement from the storm, that housing was going to be one of the City’s biggest challenges. 
As a result, Mayor Bloomberg created the Office of Housing Recovery Operations (HRO, 
conceived as temporary but still in operation today) designed to be a single agency to coordinate 
housing recovery money received through HUD and deliver it to residential applicants (Office of 
Housing Recovery Operations, 2012) (Burley, in discussion with the author, 2018). Within about 
a week the City had launched the Rapid Repairs program, an initiative designed to allow 
residents to return to damaged homes as quickly as possible by providing free repairs to ensure 
the safe occupancy of a home while processes were formed to assist with more permanent 
repairs. About 2,300 properties on Staten Island participated in the program in the first four 
months (Chaban, 2013). In addition to these initial and temporary repairs, Mayor Bloomberg 
called together a taskforce to create the City’s long-term recovery strategy, the Special Initiative 
for Rebuilding and Resiliency. Specifically, to aid in the creation of a long-term housing 
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recovery policy, what would come to be known as Build it Back, the City hired the Boston 
Consulting Group in 2013 to devise a program for one-to-four family buildings. 
 Delaying the ability to provide relief to those on the ground was the inability of the 
federal government to move swiftly. It wasn’t until January 29, 2013 that the Disaster Relief 
Appropriation Act was signed into law. Within the bill it appropriated more than $3 billion 
dollars each to New York State and City for housing recovery efforts through the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Community Development Block Grant-Disaster 
Recovery (CDBG-DR) program (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2014). 
Each time HUD releases funds through the CDBG-DR program it must write the rules for how 
the funding will be governed, which was not completed until March of 2013. Additionally, HUD 
required the City and State to create “Action Plans” for HUD’s approval as to how the programs 
would work to disperse the money to residents. These Action Plans required a couple additional 
months. 
 It is through this Action Plan that the City, along with numerous other types of recovery 
programs, describes the design of Build it Back, then going by the name of NYC Houses 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction. From the very beginning of its inception as outlined in this 
Action Plan, the City is prioritizing rebuilding over retreat. While the plan lays out methods for 
outright purchase of a home, it clearly labels these as “additional paths” and “second priority 
options” (City of New York, 2013, 63). 
 The primary options, or “Core Paths,” are offered for participating owners of one-to-four 
family structures. On the highest end is complete “reconstruction,” “residential property that has 
been destroyed or is more expensive to rehabilitate than to reconstruct” (City of New York, 
2013, 50). These building would be rebuilt, but would be subject to enhanced resiliency 
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standards, the most common of which is elevation of the structure. The middle path is “major 
rehabilitation,” suitable for structures which are not completely destroyed but are “substantially 
damaged” (meaning rehabilitation would cost more than 50% of the assessed value). These 
homes would also be subject to enhanced resiliency standards such as elevation (City of New 
York, 2013, 50). The third path is “Rehabilitation,” suitable for homes with less than “substantial 
damage” (City of New York, 2013, 50). An additional option according to Talley Burley of HRO 
was also reimbursement, suitable for homeowners who had already paid for their own repairs. 
This path provided reimbursement to homeowners within strict guidelines subject to extensive 
verification and documentation of money spent on repairs and fair value paid (Burley, in 
discussion with the author, 2018). 
 “Second priority options” include acquisition for redevelopment, where structures would 
be purchased from their current owners using, notably, post-storm (later changed to pre-storm) 
value with the intention of repurposing the parcels for future development that would “mitigate 
future risks in limited and targeted cases” (City of New York, 2013, 54). Additionally, the 
document lays out a pathway for buyouts, where unlike acquisition for redevelopment the land 
must remain as open space in perpetuity. In both cases, the Action Plan makes clear that the 
programs will be voluntary, and the City will not use eminent domain. While the language of the 
Action Plan makes it clear that the City can pursue a pathway for buyouts, it is also clear that 
such a strategy is a “second priority.” Furthermore, in the language of the Action Plan the City 
states that it will work closely with the State’s Action Plan to identify and target areas suitable 
for buyout, indicating that the City would be coordinating with the State’s buyout plan (City of 
New York, 2013, 54-55). However, as will be further discussed, coordination problems between 
the two programs soon emerged. 
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 The State also created an Action Plan which, among various programs, proposed the 
Recreate NY Home Buyout Program which later became the New York Rising Buyout and 
Acquisition Program. This program included similar buyout pathways to the City’s action plan. 
One pathway would be a “standard buyout,” similar to the City’s acquisition for redevelopment, 
these properties could be redeveloped in a resilient manner. Another pathway would be 
“enhanced buyouts.” These enhanced buyouts would act as a retreat mechanism requiring that 
acquired land be used as open space (New York State Homes, 2013, 40-41).  
The “enhanced buyout” strategy is the one the City refers to in its own Action Plan when 
it mentions its intention to coordinate. A crucial difference between the State’s buyout plan and 
the City’s is that the State is willing to offer pre-storm value for homes and also includes a 
number of additional add-on incentives to encourage participation and relocation nearby. These 
include an additional 15% of the pre-storm value as well as a 10% “enhanced buyout incentive” 
(a tactic the City will later adopt as well) (New York State Homes, 2013, 40-41). These extra 
incentives are deemed necessary as the program recognizes that if retreat is to be effective as a 
strategy it must include as many homeowners in the targeted area as possible.  
In lieu of eminent domain the program chooses to remain voluntary and use incentives to 
encourage participation. From my conversations with experts it appears that one of the barriers to 
implementing buyout programs is the fear of losing population and tax base, in an apparent 
attempt to rectify this issue provisions were made for an additional 5% incentive for residents 
who relocate within the City. The State’s plan also makes explicit that residents of New York 
City will be eligible for the buyout options provided by the State, whereas other parts of its plan 
will operate outside of New York City (New York State Homes, 2013).  
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Through these Action Plans it is already clear that residents will soon be confronted by 
multiple recovery options, with perhaps conflicting overall strategies, options, and goals. In fact, 
considerable confusion was created by the presence of the two programs, as well as seeming 
antagonism between the City and State. Despite the State’s goal of working with localities to 
help determine areas eligible for buyouts, and the City’s language in their own Action Plan that 
they would support the State’s buyout program, it appears that the Governor announced plans to 
offer buyouts to residents along the East Shore in defiance of the City’s own plans for the area. 
Additionally, it appears that residents of the East Shore worked around the City, rather than 
through it, when it appealed to the State to qualify for its buyout program. These issues are 














East Shore Buyouts 
 
Figure 7: Graham Beach Buyout Sign from 2013, Still Present in 2018. Photo by Author, March 24, 2018. 
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Bottom-Up Committee 
 Residents along the East Shore have been organized for flood resilience advocacy as far 
back as at least the Nor’easter of 1992, after which the neighborhood of Oakwood Beach formed 
the Oakwood Beach Flood Victims Committee. The advocacy did not immediately pay off, but 
by 2000 construction of a temporary levee was started by the Army Corps. Following Sandy, the 
area’s long history of flooding combined with the slow or absent construction of adequate 
protections were strong factors influencing the consideration of advocating for buyouts (Knafo 
and Shapiro, 2012). Knafo and Shapiro (2012) confront the seeming contradiction that a 
neighborhood distrustful of government would seek a bail out from the government, but it is 
precisely this mistrust of the government’s ability to provide protection from future events that 
pushed residents to seek a way out. 
 Following Sandy, several residents came together to form the Oakwood Beach Buyout 
Committee in order to convince, first their neighbors and then the government, that a buyout was 
the best strategy for the neighborhood. Members soon realized that time was of the essence. 
They needed to organize before the government could mobilize contradictory plans which would 
be hard to overcome, and they needed to act quickly before local residents had a chance to repair 
and return to their homes. Still, it was unclear if the community would be willing to abandon 
their homes. At an organized meeting just three weeks after Sandy, local resident Joseph Tirone 
asked a crowd of nearly 200 residents, if they were offered the pre-storm value for their home 
who would they be interested in selling. Almost everyone raised their hand (Rush, 2015). 
 Staten Island, and particularly the East Shore where the buyouts took place, also has a 
different demographic and political makeup than the rest of NYC as a whole. Additionally, it has 
a different housing typology with vastly more single-family units and higher home ownership 
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rates. The chart in Figure 8 shows some of these key demographic variables according to who 
was living in the two census tracts prior to Sandy during the 2010 census. Oakwood Beach is 
located in census tract 128.05 and the neighborhoods of Ocean Breeze and Graham Beach are in 
the same census tract, 112.01. 
 
Demographic Variable Ocean Breeze and 
Graham Beach 
Oakwood Beach New York City 
Population 5,758 3,158 8,175,133 
Percent White 85.9% 91.6% 44% 
Percent Black 1.2% 0.8% 25.5% 
Percent Asian 8.2% 4.8% 12.7% 
Percent Hispanic 10.5% 8.8% 28.6% 
Median Age 40 39.7 35.5 
Percent Owner 
Occupied Housing Units 
71.2% 76% 31% 
Figure 8:  Selected Demographic Variables for Ocean Breeze and Graham Beach (Census Tract 112.01) Oakwood Beach (Census 
Tract 128.05) and New York City. Chart by Author from 2010 Census. 
Figure 8 clearly shows how different the makeup of the East Shore is compared with New York 
City as a whole. Particularly the predominately white racial makeup of the area along with the 
higher rates of owner occupied units and a slightly higher median age than the rest of the City. In 
addition to the demographic differences, the area also skews much more conservative with those 
I interviewed stating that there was a libertarian predisposition for some who lived in the buyout 
areas (Pawlowski, in discussion with the author, 2018)(Koslov, in discussion with the author, 
2018). 
 In conversation with Dr. Liz Koslov (a Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow at MIT and 
sociologist who has conducted extensive research along the East Shore post-Sandy) I was told 
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that the conversion of the land to open space was a key component of the neighborhoods 
willingness to participate. The distrust of government meant that they didn’t want to sell their 
land if it could later be sold at a profit to developers, nor did they want developers profiting from 
the land either. Additionally, residents perceived overdevelopment as one of the causes of 
flooding and didn’t want to see the pattern recreated. Instead, they thought additional open space 
would serve as protection for their neighbors who either chose to stay or resided outside of the 
designated buyout zone (Koslov, in discussion with the author, 2018). Others I spoke with 
(asking that they not be identified for these particular comments) were more skeptical stating that 
many residents opposed redevelopment because they were fearful of the government’s plan to 
build affordable or multi-family housing on the acquired land in their neighborhood. They 
remarked that there were existing tensions between the more affluent owners in the area and 
those who resided in more affordable bungalow-style older housing and that the prospect of 
buying out much of this older housing stock and clearing out some of the lower income residents 
was appealing to more affluent, largely conservative residents. Figure 9 shows the approximate 
locations of the buyout areas and shows that these areas had lower property values than much of 
the rest of the neighborhood. This was validated when I conducted a site visit and observed much 
larger housing types just a block or two away from the buyout areas as shown in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10: Larger and More Expensive Housing Typologies were observed Just North of the Graham Beach Buyout Area. Photo by 
Author March 24, 2018. 
While going door to door, committee members began to make maps showing areas where 
residents no longer felt safe and documenting the damage from Sandy to structures (Rush, 2015). 
This type of bottom-up mobilization is in direct contrast to previous buyout strategies offered in 
the State – through the Bluebelt program and through the State’s pre-existing buyout program 
offered on Long Island (in Suffolk county) – which have tended to be top-down with the 
government identifying an area first and then approaching residents with an offer. According to 
Dr. Liz Koslov, “this type of community organization is remarkable and profoundly important…. 
Compare what happened on Staten Island with what happened after Hurricane Katrina, and what 
became known as the infamous ‘green dot’ map.” The map, published on the front page of the 
local paper – The Times-Picayune – showed green dots over neighborhoods which government 
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officials proposed to demolish and convert to open space. Residents, who had not been consulted 
prior to the maps publication were understandably furious. “This map was perceived as showing 
how more powerful ‘others’ were trying to dictate where people should and should not live,” 
Koslov says (Koslov, in Rush, 2015). The Oakwood Beach residents, on the other hand, were the 
ones advocating and requesting the buyout. 
Next residents attempted to find a government agency to which they could take their 
plan. Any hopes that the City would be a willing partner, however, were soon thwarted by Mayor 
Bloomberg’s apparent opposition to retreat as a strategy. One reason for opposition to the 
strategy is the fact that retreat as a concept seems synonymous with defeat or weakness. Further 
complicating the response is the ‘tough’ persona that New York City politicians and residents 
have adopted, specifically post-9/11. This idea of New York City as ‘tough’ has clearly 
influenced the city’s definition of a resilient disaster recovery process. In fact, following the 
definition of resilience in the SIRR report, it pithily states, “Syn: Tough[.] See also: New York 
City.” (City of New York and Bloomberg, 2013, 1). This (perhaps politically advantageous) 
approach to appear ‘tough’, I would argue, steered the city toward a definition and therefore an 
approach to resilience that focused on rebuilding over retreat. Further underscoring this was the 
statement by Mayor Bloomberg himself at the plans unveiling, “As New Yorkers, we cannot and 
will not abandon our waterfront…. It’s one of our greatest assets. We must protect it, not retreat 
from it” (Bloomberg, in Crean, 2013). Resident’s quickly realized that if they were to succeed, 
they would have to bypass the City altogether and appeal directly to the Governor. 
Appealing to the State 
In contrast to Mayor Bloomberg, Governor Cuomo’s public speeches seemed much more 
sympathetic to the idea that some flooded areas shouldn’t be built back. Cuomo seemed to think 
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that the State was experiencing increased events as a result of climate change and that it needed 
to rethink land use into the future (Kaplan, 2013). Just two months after the storm, Governor 
Cuomo announced his intentions to create and offer a buyout program for residents who no 
longer wished to remain in harm’s way, citing that “there are some parcels that Mother Nature 
owns” (Cuomo, 2013).  
At the end of February 2013 Governor Cuomo announced that the community of 
Oakwood Beach would serve as a pilot for his buyout program and he authorized members of the 
neighborhood to begin an online pre-registration process. In order to handle the recovery efforts 
Governor Cuomo created the Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery (GOSR) in June 2013 which 
would oversee the buyout program as well as administer the CDBG-DR grants. By October the 
administration had officially closed on its first home buyout in Oakwood Beach.  
During this time six other Staten Island communities organized and signed petitions 
requesting participation in the buyout program: Graham Beach, Ocean Breeze, South Beach, 
New Dorp Beach, Crescent Beach, and Tottenville Beach (Rush, 2015). The administration 
developed strict criteria to determine which communities would qualify, chief among them was a 
high rate of participation within the neighborhood and presence within the State’s identified 
extreme coastal risk zones. Additional factors included severe damage during Sandy, a history of 
repeated flooding, ability for newly formed open space to tie into the Bluebelt and existing 
wetlands, presence within the 100-year floodplain, and little chance of protection through other 
means of mitigation. Of these additional communities only Graham Beach, and Ocean Breeze 
were ultimately accepted into the program meeting the requirements of the State for 
participation. Ocean Breeze was officially accepted into the program in November 2013 and 
Graham Beach was not accepted until April of the following year, a full year and a half after the 
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storm and 14 months after Oakwood Beach. The time frame it turns out would be crucial for 
determining the participation rates in the communities. 
 
Figure 11: New York State Coastal Risk Map. Perkins Eastman, 2014. 
A City Evolving 
 There are a variety of reasons why the City itself may have preferred strategies to 
recovery other than retreat. One belief is simply that the City did not appreciate the State acting 
unilaterally within its own borders. While the City and State were ostensibly coordinating their 
efforts, it appears that the offer of buyouts in Staten Island occurred in opposition to the Mayor’s 
overall goals. This may have been perceived as a violation of “home rule” which is a general 
understanding that a City should control its own land use, although there was some warning, 
telegraphing, and back-channeling of the State’s intentions (Pawlowski, in discussion with the 
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author, 2018). Some believe that Cuomo was simply more sensitive to political lobbying by 
resident’s than Bloomberg, who was term limited during his third term as New York City Mayor. 
Perhaps the chief reason uncovered through my conversations and research, however, is 
the City’s lack of affordability and low vacancy rates. Demolishing homes, especially market-
rate workforce housing was poor optics, if nothing else, for a city grappling with housing 
affordability issues. An issue that has carried over into the de Blasio administration with even 
more gusto. In my discussion with Deborah Morris, the Executive Director of Resiliency 
Planning, Policy, and Acquisitions at NYC Dept. of Housing Preservation and Development 
(HPD, the agency which administers acquisitions and buyouts as well as rebuilds for participants 
of the Build it Back program) she says that there are buyouts and there is housing recovery and 
the two somewhat work toward opposite ends. Instead, the agency believes that most coastal 
locations could be built to standards that are resilient and that there’s room for even increased 
density in many coastal areas (Morris, in discussion with the author, 2018). This is something 
that I found significant, by putting HPD in charge of properties that are substantially damaged, 
an agency with increasing housing and affordability as its mission, it necessarily makes a 
statement as to what the priorities and desired outcomes of the program will be. 
When I asked Ms. Morris her opinion of the buyouts that occurred in Staten Island, she 
acknowledged that she did think that some of these areas were appropriate for buyouts, however, 
she added a caveat that I heard from many I spoke with about the uniqueness of Staten Island 
compared with the rest of the City. She cited the older age of the bungalow style housing and the 
predominately single-family character along with inadequate infrastructure that made Staten 
Island a unique case study (Morris, in discussion with the author, 2018). While acknowledging 
the need for acquisition and buyout in some cases, it was clear that HPD would prefer to avoid 
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buyouts in whole neighborhoods and instead find ways to work with neighborhoods to target 
acquisitions for the most vulnerable while simultaneously increasing density in less vulnerable 
parts of the neighborhood to accommodate the loss of residential units. 
Through my conversations with individuals working for agencies running these housing 
recovery programs I came to understand that these recovery programs are set up and designed to 
respond to the needs of individual property owners, and as such conducting strategies for 
neighborhoods and communities is more difficult (Morris, in discussion with the author, 2018) 
(Burley, in discussion with the author, 2018). However, Thaddeus Pawlowski told me that 
neighborhood contextual inputs are still used when the City considers what options it will offer 
participants and that the program does work to try to create clusters of participants wherever 
possible (Pawlowski, in discussion with the author, 2018). Perhaps in recognition of this, the 
City has launched a number of community scale planning initiatives aimed at making more 
comprehensive strategies for continued aid and acquisition policies into the future, but also for 
identifying coastal areas where density might be increased. One of these initiatives is run by 
HPD and is an interesting community plan which includes attempts to acquire property and 
relocate citizens within their same neighborhood, Edgemere, community located in the 
Rockaways, Queens. The result is the Resilient Edgemere plan published in 2017. Another 
planning process, conducted by the Department of City Planning, is the Resilient Neighborhoods 
initiative (also published in 2017) which selected several coastal neighborhoods throughout the 
five boroughs of the city for community-scale resilience plans. One of the communities profiled 
is the East Shore. These plans are discussed in greater length in the next chapter. 
Regardless of the City’s apprehension to the State’s buyout program along the East Shore 
to begin with, it became clear early on that these areas were about to become increasingly 
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complex for the City based upon the “holdouts” (those residents who for a variety of reasons live 
within the buyout area but declined to participate). This is less of an issue in Oakwood Beach 
where participation was very high (above 90%), but very much remains an issue for Graham 
Beach, and Ocean Breeze where participation was much lower (Despite repeated attempts the 
Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery would not release actual participation rates). According to 
my conversation with Dr. Liz Koslov, the significant delay in roll-out for the program in these 
two neighborhoods meant that residents had already moved back to their homes and made 
repairs, or in some cases had become unable to pay their mortgages and developed debt on the 
property adding barriers to participation (Koslov, in discussion with the author, 2018). The result 
of this up to 18-month delay between the storm and program roll-out meant that residents were 
more skeptical that the program would come to fruition and this lowered the rates of 
participation.  
When neighborhoods are targeted for buyout and participation is low, it creates a myriad 
of other problems, which may in fact leave a neighborhood less cohesive and therefore 
potentially less socially resilient than it would have been had the buyouts never occurred. This is 
due to variety of factors, including the possibility that a municipality might be less invested in 
providing infrastructure for neighborhoods with a diminished tax base and more isolated 
structures. There is a fear that increased open space along with isolated structures — leading to 
decreased “eyes on the street” — might make these neighborhoods more susceptible to crime. 
Additionally, while this did not ultimately impact the funding allocation for the Army Corps 
levee, it is difficult from a cost-benefit analysis to justify continued funding for any 
infrastructure, including flood protections, if less property and people are in harm’s way. 
Everyone working for any government agency I spoke with was quick to point out that in a city 
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like New York, these risks are much lower because the City operates more like a region and can 
afford to lose density is some areas while increasing in others, but the fear of a declining 
population and tax base is often a disincentive for municipalities to pursue buyouts in general. 
While the City may feel confident that it will continue to plan and invest in these 
communities, residents appear to be more fearful. According to Dr. Koslov: 
A lot of it depends on resources. The big fear among residents who are staying, including 
those on the edge of Oakwood Beach which is mostly gone, is if there’s not funding for 
maintenance of those areas they fear a reversion to illegal dumping that parts of Staten 
Island have seen in the past and people are also really concerned about the opioid 
epidemic and whether these will be areas for drug deals. These concerns about 
maintenance existed before Sandy with the conditions of the roads and the drainage 
infrastructure. So that’s the question, when you have a loss of population with fewer 
resources coming in through that regard will they be a lower priority for the City to take 
care of those neighborhoods and do you get something that looks more like gradual 
disinvestment and blight? Another possibility is that you get decreased social resilience 
that comes in the form of a loss of public spaces and community cohesion. I don’t think 
that that’s a given, but it really depends on the resources that are going to be invested 
there (Koslov, in discussion with the author, 2018). 
 
Just as important as how to serve and protect those residents who remain, is what to do 
with the newly formed open space that is created. If the idea is to use this open space to tie into a 
Bluebelt, or serve as marshland, that becomes increasingly difficult if the open space is part of a 
patchwork of parcels mixed in with occupied housing. Similarly, this pattern makes it difficult to 
convert the space to meaningful recreation or parkland. Additionally, the resulting neighborhood 
physically reflects the result of multiple recovery programs and strategies at work in a single 
neighborhood. Figure 12 shows an empty buyout lot next to an unimproved bungalow, which is 
also next to an elevated new or reconstruction. This physical manifestation of multiple recovery 
strategies serves as a metaphor for the overlapping recovery programs themselves. 
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Figure 12: Image Shows the Variety of Housing Recovery Strategies Taking Place in the Buyout Areas. Photo by Author, March 
24, 2018. 
 
Figure 13: Isolated "Holdout" That Still Needs Service Provision Such as Garbage Collection. Photo by Author, March 24, 2018. 
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Figure 14: Decommissioned streets lead to a disrupted street grid with dead ends, decreased connectivity and increased 
isolation. Photo by author March 24, 2018. 
 
Figure 15: Trash is Already Accumulating on Some of the Vacant Lots in the Ocean Breeze Buyout Area. Photo by Author, March 
24, 2018. 
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Ownership over the new open space is also not resolved. While it is the State who 
initiated the program and bought the properties, the State is not ultimately interested in 
continuing to own the property, nor do they want to assume liability or take on the fiscal 
responsibility of maintaining them. This is another issue that appears to have rubbed the City the 
wrong way, the fact that the State initiated this program on its own and now wants the City to 
takeover ongoing ownership of the land. While it appears that the City will ultimately take over 
ownership, the specifics of how that will happen has yet to be determined. Many city agencies 
are reluctant to take on additional funding obligations and there has been some talk of forming a 
nonprofit to maintain the land (Koslov, in discussion with the author, 2018). Figures 16 and 17 
below show generalized land ownership in 2012 and then again in 2017 to show the properties 
now owned by the State’s buyout program as well as increases to land owned by NYC 
Environmental Protection as part of the Bluebelt buyouts, and City owned lands. Land owned by 
the State shows the somewhat fragmented nature of the buyouts, particularly in Ocean Breeze 
and Graham Beach. In total the State had purchased over 560 properties in 2017 along the East 
Shore according to the City’s land use data. Likewise, properties owned by NYC Environmental 
Protection increased from about 200 in 2012 to just over 300 in 2017. 
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Figure 16: Land Ownership Along the East Shore in 2012. Map by Author, MapPLUTO 2012 and OpenStreetsMap. 
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Figure 17: Land Ownership Along the East Shore in 2017. Map by Author, MapPLUTO 2017 and OpenStreetsMap. 
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Some I spoke with at the City, such as Mary Kimball the Senior Resiliency Manager with 
the Department of City Planning — who works on a variety of projects including the Resilient 
Neighborhoods initiative which includes, among other neighborhoods, a comprehensive plan for 
the East Shore officially published in April of 2017 — think that these remaining “holdouts” can 
continue to be acquired and transitioned to open space over time (Kimball, in discussion with the 
author, 2018). 
 
Figure 18: Framework from the Resilient Neighborhoods: East Shore, Staten Island Plan. New York City, 2017. 
When speaking with Aleena Farishta of the Staten Island office of the Department of City 
Planning who worked on the East Shore Resilient Neighborhoods study, she mentioned that the 
buyout areas were deemed justified because these particular areas lacked adequate infrastructure 
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and would flood frequently even from rain (Farishta, in discussion with the author, 2018). 
However, it is hard to rectify the idea that the City will continue to invest in infrastructure for the 
“holdouts” in these buyout areas with the idea that the City will continue to incrementally 
convert it to open space through acquisition. The question brought up by Dr. Koslov of what 
these neighborhoods could become if the City gradually disinvests should be seriously 
considered. 
As such, it will be interesting to see how the City ultimately proceeds. Talley Burley a 
project manager at the Mayor’s office of Housing Recovery Operations (HRO, the temporary 
office created to manage the Build it Back program) told me that while the HRO was never 
meant to be a permanent agency there has been talk of the Acquisitions program remaining 
permanent, an indication that the City recognizes the need to continue to pursue targeted 
acquisitions, including in the State buyout areas of the East Shore. The feeling is that overtime 
many of the “holdouts” may choose to leave as half empty neighborhoods may become 
undesirable. Others, such as Deborah Morris, thinks that it may just be a matter of increasing the 
financial offers. Morris told me that Federal regulations prohibit the City from offering much 
more than about 20% above the pre-storm value of a home if using Federal funding and that the 
City also has similar restrictions for acquisitions made through City financing. While this may 
seem like a fair offer, Morris told me that it’s not enough money for families to secure other 
comparable housing in the City. Instead, she thinks if retreat is really to be pursued as a strategy 
offers as high as 200 to 300% of home value would be needed to achieve something close to full 
participation (Morris, in discussion with the author, 2018). Given this, I would argue that a case 
could be made that it might be more cost effective if the City itself built and provided new 
housing for residents of properties it wishes to acquire. This relocation strategy may provide a 
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path forward but is not without its complications. In places like Edgemere, where HPD is 
currently experimenting with the approach, attempts to relocate families within the community 
have been difficult with owners of waterfront property being some of the most difficult to 
convince (Morris, in discussion with the author, 2018). Still, HPD boasts it will have its first 


















Build It Back 
Program Launch 
 By May of 2013, following the roll-out of the Rapid Repairs program, the City unveiled 
its Action Plan for NYC Houses Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, later renamed Build it Back. 
The program as originally envisioned had 3 “core paths,” reconstruction, rehabilitation, and 
major rehabilitation. Acquisition for redevelopment was to be used in “limited and targeted 
cases,” and was described as a “second priority” for the City (City of New York, 2013). This 
language in the Action Plan shows a documented preference against acquisition and buyout by 
the City from the very earliest iterations of its housing recovery program.  
The official unveiling of Build it Back occurred at a Press Conference on June 3, 2013 
(“Mayor Bloomberg Announces”, 2013). The program was to be administered by multiple City 
agencies along with a group of consultants in conjunction with City approved contractors and as 
the complexity of the program grew over time additional municipal agencies were brought in. 
The newly created Office of Housing Recovery Operations (HRO, an entity designed to be 
temporary in nature) along with a group of private-sector consultants was to function as the 
customer service arm of the program as well as overseeing repairs and reconstruction for 1-4 
family unit structures. The Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) was 
tasked with overseeing repairs of multifamily dwellings of more than 4, providing temporary 
rental assistance for displaced persons, and overseeing the acquisition and rebuild program 
(Burley, in discussion with the author, 2018).  
 The City learned from previous housing recovery programs, including New Orleans after 
Katrina, and knew that there was a risk of funds being rescinded from home owners if they were 
not spent in strict accordance with CDBG-DR rules, which were complex. Instead, the City 
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chose to work through selected contractors to manage reconstruction on behalf of homeowners. 
Later, in order to increase contractor capacity and to assist with more complex reconstructions 
like those in Sheepshead Bay and for attached homes the Department of Design and Construction 
(DDC) was brought in as well (Burley, in discussion with the author, 2018). The City also 
learned from previous recovery programs that wealthier applicants tended to be more successful 
getting aid as they have the means to complete all the paperwork, consult legal aid, and stay the 
course through the process. As such, the City chose to prioritize those making less than 80% of 
Area Mean Income for its first round of funding. 
A Slow Start 
 The program officially began processing applications on July 8, 2013 and received 
26,000 registrations by the time it ended the registration period on October 31, 2013. The City 
completed its first acquisition on October 10, 2013 from Patricia Dresch, a Tottenville resident 
whose husband and daughter died during Sandy. Crain’s New York ran an article at the time 
critical of the pace of aid reaching applicants noting that Patricia Dresch was not only the 
program’s first acquisition, but among the first to receive assistance through Build it Back at all. 
Frustrated by the slow pace many eligible households chose to move forward with paying for 
repairs out of their own pocket. The City, including Mayor Bloomberg himself, largely laid 





Figure 19: Mayor Bloomberg and Patricia Dresch. Anuta, 2013. 
Indeed, most of those whom I interviewed working at City agencies tasked with running 
Build it Back voiced frustrations with the way in which regulations are written at the Federal 
level. Deborah Morris of HPD told me that the Federal rules, which must be written in a manner 
which serves the entire country, seem to be written more for a “single-family home on a barrier 
island off the coast of the Carolina’s, than for a place with the complexity of housing types as 
New York City” (Morris, in discussion with the author, 2018). Talley Burley with HRO echoed 
the complexity of complying with City, State, and HUD and FEMA regulations noting that 
Federal regulations in particular are often not written for attached homes (Burley, in discussion 
with the author, 2018). 
 If residents were frustrated by the slow release of aid in October 2013, they were 
certainly livid by the time a scathing New York Times investigative piece, by Russ Buettner and 
David W. Chen, arrived in September 2014 profiling the baffling lack of aid disbursement by the 
program. While the report recognizes that initial delays were likely the result of federal red-tape, 
the piece details many problems with the design and management of the program noting that it is 
“overdesigned and undermanaged.” The chief culprits according to the article were undertrained 
staff, high turnover, poor document management and computer systems that would lose 
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applicants information, and most notably the City’s requirement to serve low-income applicants 
first. To comply with the low-income requirement administrators had to perform tedious, 
complicated, and time-consuming income verification processes that significantly slowed the 
process (Buettner and Chen, 2014).  
In fact, a Build it Back participant I spoke with told me anecdotal stories of applicants 
having to redeliver physical copies of paperwork to Build it Back offices that had previously 
been submitted. This participant also told me that he spent a lot of time trying to convince other 
applicants to stay the course and stick with the program (Anonymous Build it Back participant, 
in discussion with the author, 2017). HRO, however, while acknowledging challenges for 
participants early on with the program (which it largely believes to be due to issues with the 
private-consulting companies) contends that contrary to complicating recovery, Build it Back 
participants actually benefit from participation in the program because they received assistance 
and guidance that helped streamline the arduous permitting process that has to be conducted 
regardless of participation in Build it Back. For example, Talley Burley of HRO said that the 
process for the Board of Standards and Appeals:  
…can take a year, year and a half, to two years to get the waiver that you need to rebuild 
your house. Because we work very closely with them we were able to expedite that to 
about five weeks… and that work is done for them…. additionally, applicants who have 
outstanding violations… legislation was passed that stated as long as we were moving 
forward in a manner that would fix the violation we could move forward without having 
to close out violations or existing open permits which is something that residents outside 
of the program have to do (Burley, in discussion with the author, 2018).  
 
Perhaps most critical, however, was Buettner and Chen’s assertion that in nearing the end of his 
term Bloomberg prioritized “legacy” planning projects such as the SIRR report over “urgent 
housing needs” (Buettner and Chen, 2014). Thaddeus Pawlowski also indicated that a disruption 
in leadership resulting from Bloomberg’s term limit and then Mayor De Blasio bringing in new 
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leadership to several key positions created additional delays (Pawlowski, in discussion with the 
author, 2018). 
 With the transition of leadership in New York from Bloomberg to newly elected Mayor 
Bill de Blasio, the program also began to overhaul its approach, announcing changes to the 
program in March 2014 just ahead of the publication of the “One City, Rebuilding Together” 
report in April. Chief among de Blasio’s reforms was the elimination of the low-income 
requirement for the program. The “One City, Rebuilding Together” report cited numerous other 
issues with the program including the requirement for the City to comply and verify the onerous 
federal “duplication of benefits” rule and noted general confusion among homeowners as to how 
to navigate between insurance and the various assistance and regulations at the City, State, and 
Federal level (Goldstein et al, 2014, 9, 21). 
 Additionally, the report indicates more support from the de Blasio administration for the 
acquisition pathway, noting that they would prioritize better communication about the pathway 
to homeowners (Goldstein et al, 2014). However, Staten Island Borough President James Oddo 
believes that the acquisition program has never really been taken seriously by the City, including 
under Mayor de Blasio (Crean, 2015). Moreover, just as the State saw decreased participation for 
its buyout program in Graham Beach and Ocean Breeze where the offer for buyout was delayed, 
it is fair to wonder if the City’s own slow roll-out diminished its prospects for participation in 
acquisition.  
 According to Talley Burley around 2014 or 2015 the City converted some of the 
properties in its rebuild pathway to buyout as part of its “unbuildable criteria.” This decision 
grew out of the recognition that some properties could not be built back on their current parcels. 
Most of these properties were severely damaged during Sandy and “were part of an emergency 
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demo[lition].”  Largely due to their presence in designated “Coastal Hazard Areas” or other 
sensitive areas such as wetlands (especially if on septic system and near wetland) the current 
rules would not permit the rebuilding of a structure on the site. Additional complications could 
include properties where there would no longer be legal ingress or egress. Most of these 
participants were only offered buyout (purchase of the home and conversion to open space in 
perpetuity), however, frustratingly for some participants, they were offered acquisition for 
redevelopment, where the City would not allow the current resident to rebuild their home, but 
still retains the right to rebuild something else there in the future. This is due to regulations that 
require rebuilt structures to be comparable in size to the original home and in these instances that 
just would not be possible (Burley, in discussion with the author, 2018). As far as I can tell, until 
the creation of this “unbuildable criteria” and the recognition that some parcels could not legally 
be built back, the City was not offering buyouts as a pathway, instead offering only 
reconstruction or acquisition for redevelopment. It is important to note however that a property 
that was not substantially damaged yet was on a parcel that might otherwise be considered 
“unbuildable,” would likely qualify for repair as requirements for structures less than 
substantially damaged are much more lenient. 
As of March 2018, HRO reported to me that it anticipates serving approximately 8,000 
households through Build it Back: out of which around 2,800 are receiving reimbursement only, 
1,300 are being elevated and reconstructed, and only about 100 homes are in the acquisition or 
buyout pathway. The majority of the remaining homes are receiving repairs only. The agency 
declined to provide specific breakdowns in terms of the number of participants with homes still 
under construction or awaiting assistance at this time. However, the impression that I got was 
that the vast majority of participants have received assistance in the form of reimbursement or 
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completed reconstruction and that most of the structures in the acquisition pathway have been 
closed on. They indicated that they expected the OneNYC progress report, which is on track to 
be made available publicly in late Spring 2018, to provide more solid numbers (Burley, in 
discussion with the author, 2018). It is interesting to note, however, that some are still working 
through the program nearly five and a half years after Sandy. For example, I observed several 
homes still under construction within the State’s designated buyout areas along the East Shore 
who chose instead to rebuild through the Build it Back program. This means that these residents 
still have not been able to return to a fully restored home five and a half years later.  
A Need for Neighborhood Scale Planning 
 Among the numerous challenges facing the Build it Back program was the recognition 
that because housing recovery programs are designed to respond to the needs of individual 
property owners, it was very difficult to accommodate appropriate design and planning within a 
block or neighborhood scale. For example, you might have blocks with a hodgepodge of rebuilt, 
redesigned and elevated structures right next to, or even attached to, untouched structures. In 
part, to address these challenges the Department of City Planning developed design guidelines as 
well as codified a zoning text amendment in October 2013, which addressed inconsistencies 
within the zoning text that conflicted with newly required resiliency standards such as height 
restrictions. These initial changes were followed by a text amendment in July 2015 to further 
expedite recovery by simplifying the process to document the condition of existing buildings. 
Furthermore, the City is in the process of adopting an update to the flood resilience zoning rules 
through a citywide zoning text amendment which would impact all structures located within the 
floodplain (Burley, in discussion with the author, 2018) (Kimball, in discussion with the author, 
2018). This would be a way to increase resiliency within the floodplain over time, with new 
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requirements kicking in with the sale of a property within the floodplain or substantial 
improvements to a structure (Greig, in discussion with the author, 2018). 
 Under de Blasio, the City did begin to explore more comprehensive neighborhood level 
planning for communities, including looking at how they might pursue acquisition for 
neighborhoods on Staten Island. Ultimately, however, this larger-scale approach was not deemed 
viable. One reason is that the City’s acquisition program came to Staten Island after the State had 
already selected communities to participate in its own buyout plan. With the State prioritizing 
neighborhoods with a high level of consensus and organizing residents under its plan the City 
was left with neighborhoods with lower levels of consensus by default. Secondly, the City was 
prioritizing acquisition for redevelopment, with the thought being to replace acquired properties 
with higher density.  
It appears that Staten Islanders in particular were opposed to these redevelopment plans 
for a variety of reasons. According to Liz Koslov, a sociologist who conducted extensive 
research along the East Shore, one reason is that they thought if their properties were converted 
to open space it might serve as an additional protection for their neighbors who chose to stay or 
reside outside of the buyout area. Secondly, however, was skepticism among many that they 
might somehow be swindled and the City along with developers would swoop in and profit from 
their properties, specifically through the development of high end condominiums (Koslov, in 
discussion with the author, 2018). Koslov also indicated that lack of trust of City government 
was a key factor and that there was a fear that increased density would exacerbate flooding 
problems for those who stayed. Others I spoke with indicated that their might be reasons inherent 
to the specific culture of Staten Island that was opposed to increased density, citing that some 
residents preferred a lower density single-family home typology (Morris, in discussion with the 
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author, 2018). Some of this is tied into the fear that some of the wealthier residents (who were 
quite supportive that the buyout areas be converted to open space to remove the poorer bungalow 
residents) feel, that increased density will include affordable housing which might bring 
undesirable neighborhood change. 
Additionally, it is inherently suspect to some residents that the City is offering to 
purchase their property because it is supposedly unsafe but then retaining the right to build 
something else in its place. Of course, the City is saying that the current structure is unsafe, not 
that the parcel itself cannot be redeveloped in a resilient manner, but this can be a difficult 
concept for homeowners to grasp. HRO employee Talley Burley did indicate that the agency 
encountered pushback among Build it Back participants for whom the City offered only 
acquisition for redevelopment as a possible pathway. She stated that in some cases it is not 
possible to rebuild a home on a parcel in a manner that will meet codes and be resilient but will 
also meet the requirements as an acceptable replacement for the current homeowner. These are 
sites where for a variety of reasons the developable portion of the parcel is significantly reduced. 
Burley indicated that it is hard for homeowners who are told by the City that they can’t rebuild 
their house, all they can do is sell it to the City, but the City retains the right to possibly build a 
structure there in the future (Burley, in discussion with the author, 2018).  
Koslov indicated that perhaps the two most important factors limiting participation, 
however, was the significant delay in the offer of acquisition (during which time many 
homeowners took it upon themselves to rebuild or may have fallen behind on mortgages and 
amassed debt) and the inability to afford alternative housing in New York City at the prices 
offered by the programs. Deborah Morris of HPD echoed this sentiment stating that homes 
would need to be purchased at perhaps, “200 to 300% of pre-storm value” for residents to afford 
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comparable housing in New York City, particularly those with single family homes (Morris, in 
discussion with the author, 2018). The final hurdle to the use of large-scale acquisition for 
redevelopment by the City was the prohibition of the use of eminent domain (which those I 
talked to stated would not have been considered even if allowed) by HUD rules. Because of all 
the challenges just stated, it would be nearly impossible for the City to acquire enough 
consecutive parcels to perform acquisition and redevelopment at a neighborhood scale, given the 
amount of time that passed between the storm and the ability to make an offer.  
Specifically, to address the issue of inadequate monetary offers for acquisition or buyout, 
in 2016 the City added an amendment to the Action Plan that would allow qualified participants 
of acquisition or buyout pathways up to an additional $150,000 in incentives. The incentive 
program would give participants up to $50,000 if they were considered Low Median Income, 
$50,000 if they purchased a new home outside of the flood zone, and an additional $50,000 if 
they relocated with New York City. However, HRO recognizes that even this additional amount 
may not be enough to encourage participation (Burley, in discussion with the author, 2018). 
Despite these challenges, it is important for planners to analyze the process as it has 
unfolded in New York City, as well as take a critical look at the process in other cities. While we 
cannot change what has already transpired the hope is that we will learn from previous 
experience and adopt these lessons into future recovery efforts. A consistent message I heard 
from those involved in administering recovery programs is that each program seems to start from 
scratch failing to learn from the disasters and recovery efforts that have come before it. The 
following chapter attempts to critically engage with some of these programs and the planning 
processes that occurred alongside them as well as existing literature to understand what lessons 




 New York City actually saw a number of planning studies launch in the aftermath of 
Sandy. These occurred both as part of the State’s New York Rising recovery program as well as 
the aforementioned neighborhood planning as part of the City’s acquisition for redevelopment 
process. Other plans include the Department of City Planning’s Urban Waterfront Adaptive 
Strategies (UWAS) and Designing for Flood Risk reports (which were actually started before 
Sandy and were about to publish as the storm hit). Additionally, Mayor de Blasio published One 
New York: The Plan for a Strong and Just City (OneNYC) in April 2015, highlighting his 
priorities moving forward (One New York, 2015).  
However, I will focus on plans that were particularly relevant to shaping the development 
and recovery of the East Shore. These reports include the City’s A Stronger, More Resilient New 
York (also known as the SIRR report), and the SImagines: Planning for Recovery Program, 
launched by a group of Staten Island architects; in addition to the New York Rising and Build it 
Back related plans. I will also discuss a couple more recent plans which includes the Department 
of City Planning’s Resilient Neighborhoods planning initiative, of which the East Shore is a 
selected neighborhood, and HPD’s Resilient Edgemere community plan. HUD’s Rebuild by 
Design competition which included proposals for Staten Island including the East Shore was 
another important process involving community input, but as the East Shore was not included as 
a finalist project to move forward it will not be discussed. 
 The SIRR report launched in December 2012 and was published under the moniker, A 
Stronger, More Resilient New York in June 2013. Language in the SIRR report echoes that of 
Mayor Bloomberg, repeating that the “City will not retreat” (City of New York and Bloomberg, 
 55 
2013, 236). The report primarily focused on City-wide initiatives that would mitigate and protect 
the City from future flooding events, identifying 77 City-wide initiatives. However, it also 
included recommendations for key communities which were impacted heavily during Sandy, 
with an additional 12 initiatives specific to the East and South Shore of Staten Island. These East 
and South Shore community specific initiatives include one initiative for coastal protection; 
seven for critical infrastructure; and four for community and economic recovery (City of New 
York and Bloomberg, 2013). 
 The report did include language around building and housing recovery for the area 
recognizing the need to repair damaged structures, incentives to increase the resiliency of 
structures (even some undamaged during Sandy), as well as the need for the City to work with 
the State to identify properties suitable for its buyout program. The report even makes reference 
to what it perceives is the areas future, stating that a “significant amount of mixed-use 
development [is] likely to take place within the 100-year floodplain overtime throughout the 
South and East Shores” (City of New York and Bloomberg, 2013, 287-288). 
 Irrespective of the report’s findings and recommendations, many in Staten Island found 
themselves frustrated with the top-down approach taken by the planning process for the report. 
Outreach for the SIRR report in Staten Island included the use of two task-forces, one made up 
of elected officials and the other made up of members of local community boards along with 
representatives from community organizations and local businesses. Despite the use of these task 
forces the planning process only included two actual public-meetings, which are described in the 
plan as merely “briefings,” both held in March 2013 (City of New York and Bloomberg, 2013, 
282).  
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Partially in response to the perceived shortcomings of the official planning processes’ 
community engagement strategies, three Staten Island Architects; Tim Boyland, Pablo 
Vengoechea, and David Businelli organized their own project, SImagines: Planning for 
Recovery Program (SImagines, 2013). The purpose of the project was to hear ideas from 
residents of the East and South Shores of Staten Island themselves. For the organizers it was an 
opportunity to rethink planning as a bottom-up exercise as opposed to the top-down methods 
they saw being used post-Sandy. The project was a collaboration between organizations such as 
Hunter College (which ultimately used the process as the basis for an urban planning studio), the 
American Institute of Architects, and the American Planning Association. Funding was provided 
by the Staten Island Foundation and Staten Island Arts (SImagines, 2013). This planning process 
is truly unique in that it was spearheaded by citizens and students, not the government. 
Additionally, those involved in the program feel that the engagement with residents was 
empowering during a time in which many neighbors felt angry and vulnerable (SImagines, 
2013).  
The Hunter College studio report, which was initially sparked as part of the SImagines 
process ultimately included buyouts and acquisitions as a key component of their 
recommendations, arguing that Ocean Breeze, at that point already a pilot community candidate 
for the State’s buyout program be eligible (including a section of the neighborhood not included 
in the State’s program), as well as the community of Crescent Beach an area not included for 
buyout or acquisition (Resiliency Plan for the East Shore, 2014). 
Meanwhile the State was conducting a planning study of its own dubbed New York 
Rising Community Reconstruction (NYRCR). Of the 100 selected neighborhoods across the 
State the East and South Shores of Staten Island were included. The process for the East and 
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South Shores worked through a planning committee which included 29 community members 
from a variety of backgrounds and held their first meeting to launch the project in September 
2013. The committee met monthly and worked with consultants selected by the State. They 
published a report in March 2014 and by that time had held four community meetings. Included 
in the report were “shovel ready” projects that were prioritized into three tiers. These projects 
included transit upgrades, improving emergency response, as well as coastal protection and 
stormwater management initiatives (Perkins Eastman, 2014, 12-15). The community was also 
awarded a grant of $25 million to fund projects that came out of the planning process (“Cuomo’s 
NY Rising”, 2013). However, the decision by the State to create the buyout areas along the East 
Shore had already been made prior to the completion of this report, an indication that the 
approach was responding to constituent pressure, rather than stemming from a specific planning 
study. 
 
Figure 20: Map of NYRCR initiatives for East and South Shores. Perkins Eastman, 2014. 
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In the summer of 2014 the Department of City Planning launched their Resilient 
Neighborhoods planning study which identified key neighborhoods that were impacted during 
Sandy in all five boroughs to undergo neighborhood plans to identify how resiliency could 
increase during redevelopment processes moving forward. The East Shore was a selected 
neighborhood that received its own plan which was completed in April 2017. I spoke with 
Aleena Farishta with the Staten Island Office of the Department of City Planning who worked on 
the East Shore Resilient Neighborhood initiative. Farishta illuminated some of the key 
recommendations that came from the plan which she identified as three main approaches. One is 
the creation of the East Shore Special Coastal Risk District, which was enacted in September 
2017 and includes zoning recommendations specific to the three State buyout areas intended to 
limit density and ensure new development is consistent with open space and infrastructure plans. 
The second approach applies to the entire 100-year flood plain, the vast majority of the study 
area, and contains a strategy to “advance resilient building” which includes conforming with the 
forthcoming citywide flood text amendment as well as recommendations to accommodate 
density, raise homes and encourage mixed-use. The third strategy applies to a couple of existing 
commercial corridors along Midland Avenue and Sand Lane with recommendations to revitalize 
and encourage development of these corridors to serve as “key waterfront destinations” 
(Farishta, in discussion with the author, 2018) (New York City, 2017, 37).  
The report includes an East Shore Neighborhood Framework map that shows the 
interconnectivity between the various zoning approaches and infrastructure investments moving 
forward for the community. This framework map shows information about the three different 
approaches taking place along the East Shore. First, it shows the locations of the three State 
buyout areas and also includes information about natural environments and open space, so 
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connections can be made as to how these buyout areas might connect into and enhance the 
existing natural networks. It highlights all the areas within the 100-year floodplain as areas to 
“advance resilient building” and shows the location of the strategic commercial corridors. 
Finally, the map shows the Army Corps of Engineers proposed line of protection which has 
finally received full funding to move forward (New York City, 2017, 37) (Farishta, in discussion 
with the author, 2018). 
 
Figure 21: Framework from the Resilient Neighborhoods: East Shore, Staten Island Plan. New York City, 2017. 
Finally, I would like to discuss the Department of Housing Preservation and 
Development’s (HPD) efforts in Edgemere, the Rockaways, Queens, through their Resilient 
Edgemere planning process. While not directly related to the East Shore, this plan is an 
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important step forward in HPDs attempts to advance community planning, touting that Resilient 
Edgemere: 
demonstrates that engaging local residents can result in thoughtful solutions to the 
complex challenges posed by adaptation to climate change and historic disinvestment; 
and, at its best, serves as a model for how communities can collaboratively build a shared 
vision for a resilient future (New York City Department of HPD, 2017, 6). 
   
The plan features initiatives under four major community goals: protect the neighborhood from 
flooding, create resilient housing and maintain low density feel, improve streets and 
transportation, and increase neighborhood amenities. Perhaps most interestingly, under the 
protect the neighborhood from flooding goal, a strategy emerged to adapt to increased flood risk. 
This strategy includes an initiative to, “Facilitate relocation away from extreme flood hazard, to 
help reduce damage from floods and create opportunity for enhanced coastal protection features 
and amenities” (New York City Department of HPD, 2017, 16). As part of this initiative HPD 
developed a hazard mitigation zone where Build it Back participants would be offered buyout 
only, paired with an innovative relocation assistance program to more resilient areas within the 
community (New York City Department of HPD, 2017). When speaking with Deborah Morris of 
HPD she was excited that the first few relocations should be completed in the Spring of 2018, 
however, she emphasized the difficulties inherent in garnering participation in the program. 
Morris said that participation was especially difficult for homeowners of waterfront property, 
who have bought their home specifically for the wonderful waterfront views (and water access as 
some of these homes even have docks) and are reluctant to relocate away from the water (Morris, 
in discussion with the author, 2018). Others have indicated, however, that while relocation may 
work in Edgemere due to a large amount of property already owned by HPD, it may be more 
difficult in other neighborhoods (Burley, in discussion with the author, 2018). 
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Figure 22: Short and Long-term Vision for the Edge Condition of Edgemere. Resilient Edgemere, 2017. 
Despite the intensity of planning occurring in the City as a whole and specifically for the 
East Shore, it is clear that decisions shaping recovery programs, and indeed the designation of 
the buyout areas, were occurring prior to large scale community engagement by government 
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agencies and even before official planning reports were published. Instead of basing recovery 
strategies on sound planning studies paired with extensive engagement, it appears that areas able 
to politically mobilize and lobby were favored in the State’s fiscally constrained buyout program.  
Additionally, the establishment of recovery programs to respond to individual property 
owners needs meant that integration with larger scale community wide planning efforts was 
difficult to achieve. Despite these limitations, significant planning work has been accomplished 
and coordination between agencies administering recovery programs, such as HPD, and planning 
agencies, such as DCP, seems to be much better. This can be evidenced through the more recent 
planning activities such as DCPs Resilient Neighborhoods and HPDs Resilient Edgemere. 
Unfortunately, these two planning efforts were not complete until 2017, more than four years 
after Sandy. Despite the benefits of conducting these studies, both in terms of directing 
additional recovery efforts and in preparation for the next disaster, Thad Pawlowski indicated 
that many people did not understand the value of conducting such studies after a disaster had 
occurred, arguing that it was already too late even immediately after Sandy (Pawlowski, in 
discussion with the author, 2018).  
New Orleans 
 The recovery efforts in New Orleans are a natural point of comparison for New York’s 
recovery because it stands as one of the few recent efforts of comparable scale to Sandy, and as 
such, served as a point of comparison and learning for those making plans post-Sandy. For 
example, the widely reported issues with fraud and abuse of the city’s Road Home Program 
(Similar to NYCs Build it Back) was a major contributing factor for why NYC chose to work 
through City selected contractors as opposed to providing money directly to applicants. This 
strategy was an attempt to more closely adhere to the myriad of City, State, and Federal 
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regulations to avoid instances of money given to some applicants and then later being rescinded, 
as had happened in New Orleans (Burley, in discussion with the author, 2018). 
 Perhaps most relevant, however, was the notorious public backlash at New Orleans’ 
perceived attempt to conduct retreat, which no doubt influenced the development of retreat and 
buyout strategies for New York State and the City alike. New Orleans’ original recovery 
planning body, the Bring New Orleans Back Commission, had worked with the Urban Land 
Institute which created a now infamous “green dot” map (merely an early working prototype 
map for a possible recovery strategy), published on the front page of the Times-Picayune. The 
map had used large green circles to identify “approximate areas of expected to become [sic.]  
parks and greenspace” (New Orleans “green dot” map in Rush, 2015). While the locations of the 
green dots were meant to be approximations, or rather examples, of areas that might be suitable 
for conversion to open space, the general public did not understand this nuance as conveyed 
inadequately through the accompanying news article (Nelson et. al, 2007). The resulting 
backlash from residents who had not been consulted in the development of the plan and were 
fearful that the government might be taking their home away or disallowing them to rebuild 




Figure 23: New Orleans “Green Dot” Map. Rush, 2015. 
 Amplifying the reaction was the perceived racial biases within the proposed plan. African 
Americans were disproportionately impacted by Katrina because they were more likely to live in 
areas that were vulnerable. As a result, any attempt to “shrink the footprint” was viewed as 
preventing minorities from returning (Nelson et. al, 2007. 29, 38-39). 
 Just as in New York, New Orleans had multiple, discrete planning processes that 
emerged and ran concurrently: the Bring New Orleans Back Commission, the New Orleans 
Neighborhoods Rebuilding Plan, and the Unified New Orleans Plan. The City Council adopted 
all three of these plans along with two additional grassroots efforts – the People’s Plan for 
Rebuilding the 9th Ward and Broadmoor’s rebuilding plan – in June 2007 as the official 
Citywide Strategic Recovery and Redevelopment plan. However, as recommendations in the 
plans were sometimes contradictory the path foreword was not always clear. 
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 Bring New Orleans Back (BNOB) officially launched a month after Katrina in September 
2005. The process has been described as “top-down” and recommended a four-month 
moratorium on building permits in flood-damaged areas during which time communities would 
need “to prove the viability of their neighborhoods by demonstrating that a significant proportion 
of the residents wanted to return” (Nelson et. al, 2007. 28). This idea that certain areas would 
convert to open space while other would increase density to accommodate future growth is what 
ultimately led to the “green dot” map and thus diminished the ability of the City to pursue 
managed retreat as an official strategy. 
 In the fallout of the controversy over the “green dot” map and in response to rising 
tensions between the Mayor and the City Council, the Council launched an alternative 
neighborhood planning process to replace the one recommended by BNOB, this time with the 
assumption that all areas would be rebuilt. This new initiative, the New Orleans Neighborhood 
Rebuilding Plan (NONRP) launched in December 2005. 
 In some ways to replace the City-scale recovery efforts of BNOB, the Unified New 
Orleans Plan (UNOP) was launched. Initially, it was thought that UNOP would also replace the 
Council’s NONRP process, however due to political backlash from the council members UNOP 
incorporated the previous planning efforts into its recommendations. The result of all this 
confusion was a plan with somewhat muddled recommendations in terms of specific areas to 
target for buyout and retreat strategies (Nelson et. al, 2007). Additionally, the ability to have an 
open and transparent discussion about retreat and buyout was significantly stifled. 
 To manage its housing recovery program, the Louisiana Recovery Authority created the 
Road Home Homeownership Assistance Program (also known as the Road Home program), 
which was managed by the Louisiana Office of Community Development’s Disaster Recovery 
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Unit. Rather than moving forward through a comprehensive or neighborhood scale plan for who 
would be offered buyout or reconstruction, the City proceeded to offer all participants two main 
options; rebuild in place or acquisition. Contrary to New York City’s program which only offers 
acquisition to homeowners whose homes cannot be rebuilt, or who reside in Special Coastal 
Hazard Districts, New Orleans left both options on the table for all participants. Despite the 
buyout option about 90% of participants chose to rebuild. Still, around 5,000 properties were 
acquired through the program (Nelson et. al, 2007). 
 What to do with these newly acquired properties required a host of market-based as well 
as innovative programs and incentives. While initially acquired by a State entity, the properties 
were transferred to the City’s newly formed New Orleans Redevelopment Authority (NORA) in 
2010. NORA took a predominately market-based approach redeveloping or auctioning nearly 
2,000 properties. However, it was actually through the innovative use of the Lot Next Door 
program that gave adjacent homeowners first rights to acquire vacant properties under the 
condition that they remain open green space for at least five years before becoming eligible for 
sale or redevelopment through which NORA has sold more than 1,200 properties. 
 Interestingly, it was actually through the innovation of a nonprofit that a powerful new 
strategy, one of land swaps, occurred with some success at clustering the relocation of victims. 
This non-profit was called Project Home Again (PHA). PHA worked with the New Orleans 
Redevelopment Authority (NORA, the City agency which the State transferred flood acquired 
properties to) to acquire NORA owned property, largely in the Gentilly district, where it would 
build new homes. Then, PHA would perform a buyout of a damaged home from a property 
owner and then undergo a land swap giving the Hurricane victim the new home in Gentilly while 
PHA retained the title to the original flood damaged property (Nelson and Ehrenfeucht, 2016). 
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This was a way in which redevelopment could be targeted and clustered into desired areas and 
was a unique collaboration between nonprofit and government agencies.  
 Officials in New York were aware of these programs and in many cases consulting with 
the officials in New Orleans as they worked to create their own planning reports and recovery 
programs. Perhaps some of New York City’s reluctance to specify areas targeted for retreat was 
due to the public backlash and political challenges faced by the City of New Orleans. It is 
important, however, to point out the drastically different housing markets (New Orleans was 
losing population prior to Katrina and then lost more after) between New Orleans and New York 
City as the maintenance of residential units was necessarily a higher priority due to low vacancy 
for New York City. Nevertheless, many of the challenges faced by New Orleans, multiple 
concurrent planning processes and disagreement about strategies among various levels of 














 Given the myriad complexities and challenges discussed in this paper, it is important to 
distill what can be learned in terms of strategies for New York’s continued recovery process as 
well as future recovery efforts in other places. Despite the limitations of the planning processes 
and recovery programs previously analyzed, there are, I believe, examples of useful strategies 
and successful innovation which could be used as best practices moving forward. Additionally, 
existing literature and those I spoke with offered suggestions for how the process could have 
been improved or might be improved moving forward. I have also formed opinions based upon 
my reading and discussions. This final chapter attempts to synthesize these lessons and provide 
hope that planners, politicians, and citizens are capable of devising strategies that will help us 
adapt as climactic conditions, storm frequency and intensity, and flood-prone areas continue to 
change into the future. 
First and foremost, a major shift needs to occur for increased pre-disaster planning 
(sometimes referred to as “precovery” plans). I advocate for the continued advancement of the 
Resilient Neighborhoods model to additional neighborhoods in New York City as one method 
for realizing this goal. Despite the fact that these plans are ostensibly post-disaster exercises, I 
believe that they could ultimately serve as a methodology for conducting pre-disaster community 
plans which could help transform neighborhoods incrementally before an event and be 
immediately actionable post-event.  
Unfortunately, this is no easy task as residents may not be interested in participating in 
planning charrettes designed to make them imagine a future community that has been severely 
impacted by a disaster. However, I feel that it is crucial for planners to work with local 
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communities so that both are mutually educated about disaster risk, and community desires 
moving forward. Perhaps most crucially, however, it could foster the kind of trust necessary to 
sustain residents through a recovery process and adhere to the pre-disaster plans.  
Another example worth emulating, is HPD’s Resilient Edgemere plan, which attempts to 
create a community-based plan with redevelopment that maintains the overall density of a 
neighborhood. These same types of proposals were embraced through the SImagines community 
engagement process as well, although specific design guidelines for how this would be achieved 
was not ultimately part of the SImagines process. Resilient Edgemere suggests that density could 
be increased in less vulnerable areas and assistance offered to residents of flood-prone parcels for 
relocation within the same neighborhood. These recovered parcels can then be converted to open 
space to serve as natural protections and barriers for the remainder of the community.  
Additionally, these pre-disaster plans might create the conditions for more immediately 
actionable recovery efforts post-disaster which would not suffer delay while awaiting a planning 
process, nor proceed ahead of one. The pre-disaster plans might also help municipalities 
understand which neighborhoods would be suitable for conversion to open space and which are 
more suitable for redevelopment, should acquisition or retreat be determined as an acceptable 
strategy. This would then allow buyout offers to be made immediately, which would maximize 
participation. This could also avoid the problem of multiple plans and multiple recovery 
programs being offered in the same geographic area, making it impossible for planners to 
determine which residents will participate in which plan and confusing residents, further 
complicating acquisition and buyout decisions. 
 However, this still encounters the issue that acquisitions and buyouts are often resisted 
when perceived as part of a top-down strategy, as in New Orleans. Instead, I gathered from my 
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discussions with Dr. Liz Koslov, one approach might be to invest in strong community 
organizing that would result in strong neighborhood coalitions that could advocate for buyout or 
acquisition as a community post-disaster (Koslov, in discussion with the author, 2018). This 
would be similar to how the process played out in Oakwood beach which was able to create a 
strong coalition, thanks in part to the existence of former post-disaster committees from previous 
storm events. If these coalitions could be supported, either through available meeting space or 
funding support, it might create the conditions for more unanimity and neighborhood preference 
for retreat after future disaster events. This is another initiative that could lead to increased trust 
among neighbors and with government agencies. 
Dr. Koslov also spoke of what I think is a completely overlooked issue, that of a dying 
local media. Communication post-disaster is key to creating coalitions and unified communal 
support for retreat strategies and for informing about available buyout or other recovery 
programs. According to Koslov, many residents (especially elderly) found out about various 
community meetings along the East Shore as well as the existence of the State’s buyout plan 
through the local paper, the Staten Island Advance (Koslov, in discussion with the author, 2018). 
Staten Island is the only Borough in NYC with its own paper and it is fair to wonder if 
organizing efforts in other communities were hampered by the lack of local community papers. 
This is not an issue I’ve found raised in other literature or by other experts, but it’s fair to wonder 
just how much influence local media reports have on influencing public perception (especially 
given the “green dot” map on the front page of the Times-Picayune in New Orleans) and 
ultimately, decisions about participation in recovery programs. For this reason, perhaps City’s 
should consider their post-disaster communication strategies, especially as it relates to local 
media. 
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Other strategies could include making acquisition funds and programs permanent. The 
benefits of this would be two-fold, first it could be used to continue to incrementally convert 
“holdouts” in current buyout areas to open space, and second it would prevent the need to create 
a program from scratch when the next disaster takes place. One suggestion I heard from Deborah 
Morris is to move these recovery programs away from current government agencies, or newly 
created temporary agencies, and instead create quasi-governmental corporations similar to those 
already in existence in NYC (Such as the Economic Development Corporation of the Housing 
Development Corporation) (Morris, in discussion with the author, 2018). These quasi-
governmental organizations could avoid some of the political pressures and spending regulations 
inherent to regular City agencies or Mayor’s offices. Additional advocacy for reforms at the 
Federal level might allow for pre-defined frameworks for Action Plans which in addition to 
existing permanent agencies could drastically reduce the roll-out of Federal aid disbursement to 
victims.  
There are additional concerns about how to address areas like Graham Beach and Ocean 
Breeze which saw low levels of participation in the buyout plan and now are left with a 
neighborhood pocked by empty, undevelopable lots. One solution might be to consider leasing 
adjacent lots to existing homeowners who could care for their maintenance in exchange for their 
use as additional lawn space or gardens. By using leases rather than outright sale the ability to 
cluster lots for other future uses is still retained. Additionally, cities have to recognize that 
pursuing retreat strategies in areas with low participation will necessarily require significant 
investment in infrastructure for a smaller population.  
My final observations are about floodplains. First, the City should continue to advance 
enhanced floodplain measures through the implementation of the citywide floodplain zoning text 
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amendment and recommendations for building codes such as those found in the City’s Design 
for Risk Report. Additionally, the City should also continue its work with FEMA to update the 
Federal Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM) which are expected to increase the area of the 100-year 
floodplain to include parcels previously outside of the zone. This change is necessary to 
adequately convey risk to the public and developers, as well as to increase the resiliency of 
structures within the zone over time and extend insurance requirements to vulnerable parcels. 
However, perhaps more crucially for the long-term viability of the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP), is that it needs to expand the current pool as the program is not sustainable in 
its current form. 
While these changes are needed, such requirements could place significant financial 
burdens on existing homeowners who might now be subject to increased resiliency standards for 
their home or expensive flood insurance premiums. When speaking with Katherine Greig, 
formerly of the Mayor’s Office of Recovery and Resiliency (ORR), she indicated that the NFIP 
would most likely grandfather in existing homeowners and offer insurance premium subsidies to 
low-income residents (Greig, in discussion with the author, 2018).  
While I agree with the approach of updating and expanding the floodplain, as well as 
strategies such as subsidies and grandfather clauses, I also foresee some potential problems with 
this approach. First, by grandfathering in existing homeowners but triggering compliance with 
increased resiliency standards and the payment of high flood insurance premiums with the sale of 
a home, the City is potentially trapping people into existing vulnerable housing stock. Second, by 
subsidizing insurance premiums NFIP might also be obscuring the true costs, and therefore risks 
of living in the floodplain. The City and FEMA will need to grapple with these issues as it moves 
forward. Furthermore, according to my conversation with Thaddeus Pawlowski, the long-term 
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viability and sustainability of the entire flood insurance system is under threat. The program is 
paying out more than it is collecting (even though payouts are capped at $250,000 for residential 
and $500,000 for commercial properties) and is continually reauthorized on a short-term basis as 
opposed to finding a longer-term solution for the funding short fall. The system seems to be 
stuck between slowly raising premiums and expanding the pool while not pricing out lower 
income residents (Pawlowski, in discussion with the author, 2018). While I don’t have the 
solution to the insurance problem, it is clear that major problems inherent within both the 
floodplain maps and insurance system need to be addressed in a long-term and sustainable 
manner. 
All of these initiatives are hampered by innate human biases that hamper the ability to 
accurately assess risk (Kahneman et. al, 1982). An out of sight out of mind mentality and 
recency bias are real challenges that can hamper community planning initiatives and lead to 
seemingly irrational decision-making based upon risk. This does not occur because people are 
unintelligent, but is rather part of the complex psychology of, for example, having to imagine 
being forced to leave not just a house or structure, but a home. However, some of this is the 
result of inaccurately expressed risk through out-of-date floodplain maps or subsidized insurance 
rates that may obscure the true costs and risks of homeownership in flood-prone areas. 
Ultimately, policies and education initiatives must be aimed at helping current residents, 
prospective waterfront dwellers, developers, and municipalities understand the true risks and 
costs associated with continued or non-resilient development of these vulnerable areas, along 
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